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The decline in electoral support for the African National Congress (ANC) in the recent local 
government elections incited many 
to predict its imminent demise. The 
results represent discontentment and 
rejection of the ANC by a significant 
number of voters, predominantly in 
urban areas. The decline is not a new 
phenomenon as it started with the 
2009 elections. It is, however, more 
startling to note that the decline is not 
only in the aggregate percentage but 
also in terms of the actual number of 
voters.
This was a rude awakening for 
the ANC. Things could have been 
worse. Despite all the organisational 
challenges in the period preceding the 
elections, there were still many voters 
whose loyalty to the ANC remained 
undeterred. Taking a positive view, the 
decline is heralding a critical historical 
juncture the ANC has been waiting for 
to genuinely embark on organisational 
renewal. 
Despite the erosion of its electoral 
base, the ANC remains the governing 
party and by far the most significant 
political force in South Africa, unlike 
the misfortunes suffered by sister 
organisations, such as, the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (Sandinistas) 
of Nicaragua, the Indian Congress 
Party, and the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) of Zambia. 
All these parties were voted out of 
power as a result of organisational 
paralysis and rot. Similar to the ANC, 
the signs of paralysis in these parties 
started showing long before the 
desolate electoral defeats. 
Following its poor electoral 
performance, the ANC committed to a 
process of deep introspection. Drawing 
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from the experiences of the Sandinistas, 
the Indian Congress and UNIP, this 
article seeks to demonstrate that 
introspection does not automatically 
result in organisational renewal, 
but that the quality of leadership 
will inevitably determine the future 
prospects of the party.
The different experiences of the 
Sandinistas, the Indian Congress and 
UNIP demonstrate that undertaking 
introspection without a revolutionary 
leadership is tantamount to viewing the 
challenges confronting the organisation 
in a cracked mirror, seeing multiple 
and distorted images of the same 
object. Viewing the organisational 
challenges confronting the ANC in a 
cracked mirror will inevitably result in 
a false understanding. 
The central argument in this article 
is that the revolutionary leadership 
with the capability of theoretical 
firmness and action is necessary for 
organisational renewal, because the 
renewal of the party cannot be built on 
the quicksand of ideological confusion. 
Furthermore, such revolutionary 
leadership must have the capacity to 
honestly identify political tendencies 
that are detrimental to the movement, 
and provide fundamental solutions. 
Sandinistas, the Indian Congress 
and UNIP
The electoral defeat of the 
Sandinistas in 1990 became a topic of 
harsh dispute within the party. These 
disputes threatened to destroy the 
party as new ideological divisions were 
opened that presented great difficulties 
for internal cohesion. Another difficulty 
for the Sandinistas was the internal 
organisational structure of the party that 
was enmeshed with the administrative 
structure of the state, which meant 
that the loss of government meant the 
loss of party structures and dispersal 
of membership when thousands lost 
their jobs. As a result, the strength 
of the Sandinistas dissipated from 
several thousands of members to a few 
hundred after the elections. 
To understand the cause of the 
defeat, the Sandinistas embarked on 
a deep and extensive introspection, 
which involved engagement with 
all party structures and broadly with 
progressive social formations. These 
engagements culminated in a national 
consultative forum of diverse interest 
groups to chart the way forward. Such 
introspection marked the beginning 
of a process to reconstitute the party’s 
traditional political line. This led to a 
programme for modernisation of the 
party, but not at the expense of its 
revolutionary social principles. 
The modernisation was meant 
to make the Sandinistas a ‘party 
of today’ and resulted in radical 
changes to the leadership structures 
of the organisation, the process of 
acquiring membership, and the overall 
ideological orientation of the party. This 
arduous process ultimately improved 
their performance in the elections of 
2006, which increased to 62% in the 
2015 elections. 
Introspection by the Sandinistas 
was followed by deep, bold and far-
reaching corrective action to rescue 
the movement from ideological 
degeneration, ineffective leadership 
and debilitating internal battles. Unlike 
many other liberation movements, 
the audacity and political will of the 
Sandinistas’ leadership to modernise 
the party through re-engineering its 
structures, cleaning up its image and 
reconstituting its ideological outlook 
enabled the party to gradually regain 
lost ground. 
In direct contrast, the leadership 
of the Indian Congress responded 
differently when the party suffered its 
first severe electoral defeat in 1979 
after three decades in power. During 
the post-election introspection, 
they correctly identified two factors 
that adversely impacted on their 
performance: corruption and mutating 
factions that led to internal instability. 
There was little political will from the 
party leadership to decisively tackle 
these challenges head on. Instead 
the party became more polarised 
as factions became institutionalised, 
resulting in a steep surge in the levels of 
corruption within its ranks and in states 
where they governed. 
The leadership failed to modernise 
the party to be ‘a party of today’ as the 
party retained the same organisational 
structures designed in 1918 and 1920 
by Mahatma Gandhi. These archaic 
structures inhibited the capacity of the 
party to expand and boldly challenge 
factions and corruption within its 
ranks. With the 2014 elections, the 
Indian Congress had its poorest post-
independence elections performance, 
winning only 44 seats of the 543-
member house. The Indian Congress 
was caged in its legacy of leading the 
liberation struggle in India, and as a 
result failed to transform itself into a 
‘party of today’. 
Both the Sandinistas and the Indian 
Congress engaged in a protracted 
process of deep introspection after 
their electoral defeats. However, 
the distinguishing factor for renewal 
or decline of these parties was the 
quality of leadership, and whether a 
party had a leadership collective with 
the capacity to drive a programme of 
renewal. The Sandinistas had decisive 
and bold leadership that steered the 
party to resurgence, whereas the 
Indian Congress had weak leadership 
that was blinded by corrupt factions to 
the problems confronting the Party.
UNIP presents a similar case to 
that of the Indian Congress. The 1991 
elections in Zambia led to the fall of 
UNIP, a party that had led the country 
to independence. After the elections, 
the UNIP executive met in a three-day 
meeting to introspect, followed by 
extensive engagements with party 
structures to establish the cause of 
the defeat. The party identified two 
reasons that contributed to its poor 
performance: weak leadership and 
internal tensions. In the subsequent 
conference, informed by the outcomes 
of the introspection, UNIP adopted 
a political programme aimed at 
modernising the party. 
Central aspects of the programme 
were not implemented as jostling 
for power intensified and continued 
unabated. The insidious internal strife, 
which was spearheaded by senior 
leaders of the party, weakened the 
capacity of the leadership collective to 
rescue the party. Today, UNIP, like the 
Indian Congress, is a meagre shadow of 
its former self.
African National Congress
In South African politics, any 
political party of consequence must 
have the backing of the metropolitan 
municipalities. Out of the eight metros 
in the country, the ANC secured a 
T H E  T H I N K E R40
reduced majority in three: Mangaung, 
eThekwini and Buffalo City, and lost 
three metros to a coalition of opposition 
parties: Tshwane, Nelson Mandela 
Bay and Johannesburg. Losing three 
metros in one election is tantamount to 
a massive blow as all three metros are 
historic strongholds of the ANC with a 
long tradition of congress politics. 
The national share of the ANC 
vote was drastically sliced by 8% from 
62% to 54%. Sliding far below 60% is 
a major psychological defeat for the 
ANC and has served to energise the 
opposition parties towards the 2019 
general election. In response to these 
shocking results, in unison ANC leaders 
called for deep introspection. 
After the four-day National 
Executive Committee (NEC) 
introspection meeting, a statement 
was issued in which the NEC accepted 
collective blame for the poor electoral 
performance. The statement further 
attributed the poor performance to a 
wide range of issues, among them the 
internal battles and the perception 
that the ANC is soft on corruption. 
The statement further highlights fifteen 
key and immediate tasks for recovery. 
However, the fractious nature of the 
NEC invoked doubts in both the ANC 
members and supporters with regard 
to the sincerity of the NEC in accepting 
collective blame. The pronounced 
divisions in the NEC projected it as 
being incapable of acting as a political 
collective that could collectively 
share blame.
Hardly two weeks from the four-day 
NEC introspection, those who doubted 
the capacity of the NEC to shoulder 
collective blame were vindicated. NEC 
members were at cross-purposes about 
the actual meaning of the statement, 
giving conflicting accounts. Worse, 
the saga of the imminent arrest of the 
Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, 
and the early conference proposal by 
the ANC Youth League, drowned the 
statement. In the process leadership 
became distracted and derailed, with 
an undue focus on side issues. The 
statement that was meant to inspire 
confidence in the ANC and galvanise 
South Africans behind the programme 
to rescue the movement was all but 
redundant. This severely compromised 
the capacity of the ANC as a self-
correcting organisation. 
Furthermore, the NEC statement 
articulates that the ANC is a ‘listening 
and learning organisation’. If the 
#occupyluthulihouse organisers were 
ANC members or supporters, then the 
manner in which the ANC approached 
the matter contradicts the essence of 
a ‘listening and learning organisation’, 
unless the movement chooses to 
listen only to what it wants to hear. 
Introspection should be about the 
ANC opening up to diverse views. This 
suggests that the #occupyluthulihouse 
scenario should have been dealt with 
very differently. 
The ANC should have used this 
opportunity to explain its position to 
the protestors and to educate them 
on the ANC internal processes. The 
ANC is a mass based movement and 
within its ranks there will always be 
members who will be tempted at 
times to undermine the organisational 
protocol. The leadership needs to find 
a better way of providing the necessary 
leadership to these members. It was 
unfortunate during the initial contact 
that the ANC responded in a way 
that portrayed it as an organisation 
that has no explanation to make. The 
subsequent change in the approach to 
engage the group must be welcomed. 
The weaknesses that the renewal 
should address
Any genuine process of introspection 
should be underpinned by an honest 
understanding of the challenges 
confronting the ANC. The ANC policy 
document on Organisational Renewal 
mentions the notion of ‘20 years of 
curse’. This notion is derived from 
a generalisation that most liberation 
movements suffer significant losses of 
their grassroots support after 20 years 
in government. This is paradoxical, 
because liberation movements started 
with the people and they derived their 
sustenance from the people. 
The significant decline in the 
electoral support of the ANC after 
22 years in power requires a deeper 
analysis than a mere generalisation. 
Therefore the NEC must be 
commended for its commitment to 
undertake such an analysis. In the past 
15 years, some weaknesses have been 
highlighted in many policy documents 
of the ANC as having a negative impact 
on its public standing.  
This article will only deal with six 
known and pronounced weaknesses 
that could have contributed to 
the ANC shedding votes. All these 
weaknesses can be directly attributed 
to leadership failures, and to overcome 
them requires urgent and decisive 
action to renew the organisation. The 
six weaknesses are:
• Firstly, the fierce, money-driven 
and destructive internal battles for 
leadership positions. Globally, this is 
the number one enemy leading to the 
demise of liberation movements. This 
enemy is stronger than the combined 
strength of the opposition parties and 
the Western led regime-change agenda 
that is purveyed to many as seeking to 
destroy the ANC. 
Put differently, whilst the opposition 
and the West poses serious threats to 
the development trajectory and the 
existence of the ANC, it is in fact the 
internal strife for spoils and positions 
that is a much bigger enemy that 
might lead to the demise of the party. 
The threats facing the ANC are more 
insidious and arise overwhelmingly 
from within. 
The debilitating leadership contests 
are pursued as if the credit for the 
liberation struggle is infinite. In reality, 
it is characteristically exhausted in 
the minds of the population much 
sooner than leaders recognise. The 
moment arrives when the liberation 
movement is judged, not by its history 
and promises, but by what it presents 
itself to be through the collective and 
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individual conduct of its leaders. In 
most cases in the present moment 
the judgment derived from this was 
extremely harsh.
• Secondly, complacent arrogance 
that is partly the result of seemingly 
unassailable electoral support. The 
ANC fell into the trap of political 
arrogance, where some leaders thought 
that they alone know what is good for 
the broader society. 
Political arrogance contributed 
to incoherent responses and poor 
management of challenges confronting 
the ANC. Among these are the 
disastrous and incoherent responses 
to the Gupta landing at Waterkloof Air 
Force Base, the e-tolls, the non-security 
upgrades at the President’s private 
residence, the Marikana shooting, 
the allegations of state capture, the 
instability in the security cluster and 
the removal of former finance minister 
Nhlanhla Nene. This turned the tide 
of public opinion against the ANC 
and effectively bolstered the negative 
narrative. This narrative contributed 
to creating an impression of an 
incorrigibly corrupt government that 
is led by scoundrels who are beyond 
political redemption. The ANC failed to 
effectively counter this narrative, which 
was the main election sound-bite of 
the opposition parties.
• Thirdly, the failure to modernise 
and transform the party into a ‘party of 
today’. Like most liberation movements, 
there is a fear of modernisation in the 
ANC. This is derived from a mistaken 
belief that modernisation will rob 
the movement of its greatest asset, 
which is the history of the liberation 
struggle. Any attempts, therefore, to 
modernise the party are viewed in a 
negative manner. The NEC discussion 
document towards the 2007 National 
Conference, titled Organisation 
Re-engineering, encapsulated the most 
radical and progressive proposals for 
the modernisation of the party. 
The consequences of the fierce 
leadership contestation towards and 
during the 2007 conference rendered 
stillborn the proposals contained in the 
document as they were viewed with 
suspicion. The central objective of the 
document was to increase the capacity 
of the ANC to enforce discipline, 
build its cadre base and to effectively 
increase its campaigning capacity. The 
document proposed, amongst others, 
the establishment of ANC branches 
in universities for academics, in big 
hospitals and on the factory floor for 
ordinary workers. This would have 
expanded the reach of the ANC 
beyond the traditional ward-based 
branch and would have strengthened 
its mobilisation capacity, particularly in 
industrial heartlands like the Gauteng 
Province. With active ANC branches 
of academics in university campuses 
the ANC would have had better 
organisational capacity to respond to 
the #feesmustfall campaign.
• Fourthly, the enthronement of a 
development trajectory that facilitates 
growth of capital whilst imposing 
severe limitations on government 
capacity to address apartheid 
inequalities. Today, 22 years into 
democracy, South Africa is one of the 
world’s most disparate countries in 
terms of income inequality. Generally, 
more inequitable than distribution of 
income is the correlation between race 
and distribution of ownership in South 
Africa. These contradictions generate 
resentment from the more than 40% 
of South Africans who are poor, and 
cause a great deal of impatience with 
the pace of social transformation. 
This explains why the country is in a 
permanent protest season. 
That impatience is further 
exacerbated by the ANC’s poor 
articulation of its policy positions, for 
example, what concretely constitutes 
the Second Phase of the Transition: 
things which ordinary people can 
touch and feel. Central to addressing 
the three socio-economic defects, 
which are unemployment, inequality 
and poverty, is the leverage the ANC 
government has within the economy 
through State Owned Enterprises (SOE) 
like Eskom, Denel, SAA and others. 
Unlike other developmental 
states, such as China, South Korea 
and Malaysia, the ANC government 
appears to be unable to strategically 
use the SOEs as a foothold in the 
economy to direct growth and 
investment in the country. Instead, the 
levels of chaos and mismanagement in 
the SOEs, accompanied by widely held 
perceptions of runaway corruption, 
subtract the much-needed credit 
due to the ANC. Most of the SOEs 
have become a fiscal burden instead 
of being catalytic tools for 
development.
• Fifthly, the ideological 
degeneration in the ANC. This places 
the ANC in a precarious position in 
which its supporters are mistrustful of 
its motives and its record and intentions 
are disputed. Ideological degeneration 
is due to the erosion of the capacity 
of leadership to engage in ideological 
work. Over the past few years the 
whole organisational apparatus was 
propelled into a defensive mode and 
very little work was done to forcefully 
present what the ANC stands for. This 
opened up an opportunity for the 
Democratic Alliance to appropriate 
Nelson Mandela’s legacy and for the 
Economic Freedom Fighters to place 
greater claim on the Freedom Charter. 
The arrogance with which these two 
parties were able to do so was derived 
from the ANC’s own weaknesses. 
The erosion of the cadreship base 
in the ANC has further exacerbated 
ideological degeneration. Cadres are 
advanced elements at the frontline 
defence of any revolutionary 
movement. The current thin cadreship 
base exposes the ANC to all forms of 
negative tendencies. Between 2007 
and 2012, membership of the ANC 
doubled from just above 630,000 
to more than 1.2 million. There is, 
however, no systematic and sustainable 
programme for political training to 
strengthen the political understanding 
of the new members. To respond to the 
challenges of ideological degeneration, 
the 53rd National Conference in 2012 
adopted a programme A Decade of the 
Cadre. Now, four years into the ‘decade 
of the cadre’, the situation appears 
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worse than when the resolution was 
adopted.
• Sixthly, is the contemporary 
realignment of the political landscape 
within the ANC that is characterised 
by the grouping of provinces into 
visible and arrogant factional blocs. 
These blocs subordinate and eclipse 
the work of the NEC and compromise 
the unitary character of the ANC. This 
weakens the NEC and compromises its 
position as the highest decision-making 
structure between conferences. 
NEC members are under pressure to 
support and protect provincially based 
factions, with the hope of re-election in 
the next conference. These politics of 
self-interest find traction in a polluted 
and divisive political environment 
characterised by the politics of survival 
of the fittest.
A possible way forward
Introspection alone is inadequate 
to address these weaknesses and to 
get the ANC on a path to recovery. 
As with the Sandinistas, introspection 
should serve as the platform from 
which a common understanding 
about the causes and the extent of the 
weaknesses is derived. Based on the 
outcomes of such introspection, the 
movement must develop a package 
of responses that are equal to the 
challenges. Implementation of these 
responses requires decisive, bold and 
uncompromised leadership. 
As explained above, the 
distinguishing factor between the 
recovery of the Sandinistas and the 
accelerated decline of the Indian 
Congress was the quality of leadership 
or the lack thereof. It is clear, therefore, 
that the ANC has a choice: follow the 
path of the Sandinistas that requires 
radical reorientation of the organisation 
underpinned by strong leadership; or 
take the path of the Indian Congress 
that will result in accelerated decline.
The Indian Congress-path is the 
most undesirable but not unlikely, 
and would require that the ANC 
continues to gaze into the cracked 
mirror and provide cosmetic solutions 
to distorted problems, while indulging 
in self-adulation and self-delusion, 
comfortably caged within the legacy 
of a once-glorious movement. The 
Sandinistas-path would require a 
revolutionary leadership collective 
that will replace the cracked mirror 
with an undamaged one to view 
the organisation, and with visible 
decisiveness confront the real problems 
to position the organisation on the 
recovery path. 
At many critical points in ANC 
history, when the movement had to 
change course it did so successfully. 
Credit for this is due to the quality of 
leadership it had at those times. The 
first critical point was the state of the 
organisation when Zaccheus Richard 
Mahabane took over in 1937 as the 
President. Mahabane and James Calata, 
the then Secretary General, inherited 
an organisation in a state of complete 
paralysis. They commenced with a 
programme to lift the organisation 
from stagnation. Mahabane’s strong 
and resolute leadership enabled him 
to build a semblance of unity in the 
NEC and the broader movement. This 
provided the much-needed platform 
for his successor, Alfred Batini Xuma, 
to transform the ANC into a more 
modern organisation.
The second critical moment was in 
1969. As the decade after the banning 
of the ANC neared its end, there were 
serious tensions within the external 
mission that resulted in weaknesses in 
the organisational structure and style of 
work of the ANC. These weaknesses 
resulted in a paralysis and divisions 
between the leadership and the rank-
and-file that required urgent correction. 
This resulted in the convening of the 
Morogoro Consultative Conference in 
April 1969. 
Based on the report by the 
Preparatory Committee, the 
conference undertook a process of 
deep introspection on the state of the 
organisation and adopted concrete 
responses for organisational renewal. 
These included the adoption of the 
Strategy and Tactics document to 
integrate all four pillars of struggle 
and the modernisation of leadership 
structure with the establishment of a 
Revolutionary Council (RC), led by 
Oliver Tambo with Yusuf Dadoo as 
his deputy. The RC supplemented the 
more compact NEC, reduced from 
20 to 8 members. The Morogoro 
Conference was a watershed moment 
and the calibre of the leadership 
collective was equal to the task of 
renewal, thereby marking a critical 
turning point in the history of struggle 
in Africa.
Today, the Sandinistas-path for 
deep organisational renewal and 
re-engineering would first require 
certain urgent steps to be taken by the 
ANC, which are: 
• Firstly, the NEC needs to visibly 
demonstrate its capacity to lead the 
organisation. The public spats amongst 
ANC leaders and the incoherent and 
conflicting messages need to stop. 
This creates the impression of an 
incoherent organisation that cannot be 
trusted. Lower structures must be held 
accountable and the NEC must assert 
its authority over these structures and 
avoid being consumed by provincial 
political blocs.
• Secondly, in strengthening this 
process of introspection, the ANC 
needs to build a broad consensus on 
the way forward among progressive 
forces in the country. The consensus 
should be a product of frank and 
meaningful engagement. Pioneering 
such engagements will enable the 
ANC to reassert its role as the leader of 
society since such introspection will be 
extended beyond the confines of ANC 
structures and members. 
An introspection that is limited to 
ANC structures and members will be 
miserably inadequate to serve as the 
basis for renewal. An extensive process 
of engagement will create a platform 
for mass democratic formations and 
progressive civil society movements, 
which felt marginalised all the years, to 
reflect on the state of the organisation 
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and the way forward. The idea 
mooted by the SACP, as well as the 
Gauteng, Eastern Cape and recently 
ANC Northern Cape PEC lekgotla to 
convene a broad National Consultative 
Conference or Forum is very attractive 
and deserves further interrogation. The 
idea of a Consultative Conference is 
informed by the understanding that the 
ANC is not exclusively for its members; 
rather, it is a collective living heritage 
of the people of South Africa and 
broadly Africa.
• Thirdly, there is an urgent need to 
earnestly embark on the review of the 
present organisational structures of the 
ANC. Central to such a review will be 
to establish whether the current ANC 
structures are fit for purpose. This will 
encapsulate an enquiry on whether 
the current structures are adequate 
to organise and respond to the needs 
of a diverse urban population. Most 
importantly, there is the question 
of whether an ANC branch has the 
capacity to effectively respond to 
modern forms of political engagement 
by young people and particularly 
young professionals. This group seems 
to be averse to the present forms of 
branch activism of BGMs, marked by 
continuing leadership battles fuelled by 
tenders and demands for deployment. 
Implementation of conference 
decisions remains one of the biggest 
challenges confronting the ANC. The 
composition of the ANC leadership 
structures is not helpful in addressing 
this challenge. For example, the current 
NEC has 86 members, with more 
than 60 members without any clearly 
defined tasks, whom consequently 
the National Conference or the NEC 
cannot hold accountable. The ANC 
needs to consider the election of a 
smaller NEC in which at least half of 
the members are elected to execute 
certain tasks and must account to the 
NEC and the National Conference. 
The identification of the tasks will be 
informed by urgent challenges that 
the organisation must respond to. 
The task-based NEC members should 
constitute the National Working 
Committee (NWC). This would most 
likely strengthen the work of the NWC. 
• Fourthly, there is a need to 
review the process of election of 
leadership. This review must be central 
to the renewal programme. The ANC 
is no longer an illegal movement, and 
there are thus no compelling reasons 
to have the election of leadership 
shrouded in secrecy. The movement 
needs to develop mechanisms 
that allow for an open leadership 
contest that gives a stronger voice 
and participation to the branches. 
The constitutional requirement that 
branches should constitute 90% of an 
elective conference is a good starting 
point. There is a need to reinforce 
the 90% requirement through the 
introduction of approaches that protect 
branch mandates from being diluted 
by intermediate provincial or regional 
processes in leading up to the National 
Conferences. 
• Fifthly, the ANC needs to resolutely 
fight corruption and strengthen party 
discipline to regain the confidence 
of the people. The campaign against 
corruption should be pitched at the 
same scale as the campaign against 
HIV/AIDS by actively mobilising 
communities and strengthening the 
capacity of the state to investigate and 
prosecute such cases. 
The 3rd NGC took a resolution to 
strengthen the work of the Integrity 
Commission. Despite all the good 
intentions, the Integrity Commission 
has been rendered toothless and has 
become an unnecessary appendage 
treated with great suspicion. The 
manner in which the issue of the 
Western Cape Provincial Chairperson 
was and is still handled is the latest 
episode in a series of events that have 
weakened the Integrity Commission. 
As part of re-engineering of the ANC 
the Integrity Commission needs 
to be strengthened by making it a 
constitutional creature with clear 
powers. 
The amendments to Rule 25 of 
the ANC Constitution, which sought 
to strengthen party discipline, failed 
because the disciplinary processes 
are highly technical and there is 
no full-time capacity. This causes 
undue delays in the processing of 
disciplinary matters as all members 
of the Disciplinary Committee and 
the Disciplinary Appeals Committee 
are challenged by the limited time 
available to them within their busy 
work schedules. This weakens party 
discipline, as in most instances there 
are no consequences for transgressions. 
There is thus an urgent need to make 
provision for full-time capacity at both 
provincial and national level to enforce 
organisational discipline.
Conclusion
All national revolutions at some 
point or the other encounter subjective 
and objective challenges that result in 
serious setbacks. This is not unique 
to the ANC. This article demonstrates 
that after electoral setbacks the usual 
response by parties is to embark on 
a deep introspection to understand 
the causes. However, the diverse 
experiences of the Sandinistas, the 
Indian Congress and UNIP demonstrate 
that introspection alone is not enough 
for recovery, and that the right tools of 
analysis should be used to introspect, 
rather than a cracked mirror that will 
produce both imaginary and distorted 
problems. 
After their electoral defeat the 
Sandinistas embarked on a deep 
introspection that was accompanied 
by bold and decisive leadership that 
steered the renewal process within the 
party. This enabled the party to regain 
the confidence of the people and 
ultimately recovered the lost ground. 
In direct contrast, the introspection 
by the Indian Congress and UNIP was 
futile due to weak leadership. 
Furthermore, the Indian Congress 
and UNIP were trapped in their legacy 
of liberation struggle, wrongly believing 
that the legacy possesses infinite 
credits. The struggle legacy is dynamic, 
so people are not uncritical recipients 
thereof. The reflection of the people 
on the legacy is substantively explained 
by the present-day political and socio-
economic realities.
Based on these experiences the 
article argues that to reverse the 
decline in the electoral support of the 
ANC, introspection for its own sake is 
not enough. For the introspection to 
give birth to organisational renewal 
it must be accompanied by a 
revolutionary leadership that is bold, 
uncompromised and acts with visible 
decisiveness. Without a leadership of 
this calibre, the much-needed renewal 
to recover the lost ground will remain 
a mirage. ■
